Some Thoughts on Scientific Axiology

1 Some Thoughts on Scientific Axiology: Its Metaphysical Basis and Prerequisite Variables NORMAN F. HIRST Semiotic Systems Tracor, Inc., Austin Published in Gordon Conference on Human Values and Natural Science 1970 The mere menton of scientific axiology is probably sufficient to inspire a long and heated debate. Some eminent scholars are of.the opinion that there can be a scientific axiology. Other equally are just as convinced that there cannot be. We obviously sidewith the former; else we wouldn't be writing on this subject. However, while such debates can be both interesting and profitable, we would prefer not to engage in them. Rather, for our present purposes, we think there is more to be gained by continuing the search for such a success, if it is ever achieved, can be the final arbiter. By science we mean simply the use of formal notions rather than ordinary intuitive notions at key points in the course of inquiry. Whether or not an inquiry is and in what way it is empirical, can be left open except for the following remarks: 1. We assume that all knowledge, even metaphysical knowledge, has its roots in human experience. 2. The reason fot the replacement of intuitive notions by formal no- tions is to insure a common and decisive confrontation theory and relevant experience. . Regarding the second point, our concern is whether the texture of the theory fits the texture of experience. This fit need not be in terms of predictability nor even in quantitative terms. The laws of classical dynamics do not in general enable us to predict what motions will ilctually take place. Rather, they give us the conditions which must hold, if certain desired motion is to occur. We see no reason for equating empirical and quantitative unless the claim explicitly made, as it is in some physical sciences, is that, the texture of the relevant experience is that of finite arithmetic. All that seems to be required for a science is that there is an isolable, coherent, aspect of experience in which there are 'organizing principles.' An organizing 'principle is a formal principle. It is concerned with the form and order of an aspect of experience. It does not determine the concrete outcome of that aspect of experience. Structurally, an organizing principle is a uniform constraint on a set of variables. As examples, consider the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian in classical dynamics. These are particularly good examples since they are also examples of extremum principles, and we feel that extremum principles have an essential role in scientific axiology because the 'best' is an optimization of contrasts. If more familiar and simpler examples are desired, consider the conservation of energy principles. 2 As we know, organizing principles such as those mentioned are not immediate deliverances of common sense, they are not intuitive no- tions. (Though in the case of conservation of energy, it has become so commonplace that one might be tempted to think otherwise.) Similarly, we suspect the organizing principles of value will not correspond in any direct and simple way to intuitive notions. This is where most at- tempts to formalize value theory fail. They are, much too much, attempts to formalize directly our.intuitive notions-usually in the form of trying to cast our intuitive value language into a precise formal mold. We believe all such attempts are doomed to ultimate failure. They may, however, produce interesting interim insights. Now it would seem that the task of building an axiological science must begin by finding those key points at which we must replace our intuitive notions by formal notions, and by finding those variables which are to enter into the organizing principles. While it is true that these are two of the early steps, it appears to us that a funda- mental step must be taken first. It is a metaphysical step. Western thought has so far been largely dominated by the habit of resolving wholes into their ultimate and unchanging parts arranged in external configurations. By external configuration we mean a con- figuration defined as relationships which require no change in the terms because of the relationship. Indeed, there could be no change in unchanging' parts. Those aspects of experience singled out by this type of structure are·the factual aspects. This approach can never isolate the structure of value. Value is a function of the quality of experience. The structure of value is concerned with how the parts, that is experiencing individuals, change one another's experiencing by 'social' interacation. If we are to discover the rationale of value we must develop new habits of thought. In particular, we believe we must look to process, organismic metaphysics, and that we must direct our attention to the logic of 'social integration' or the formation of 'societies' in something close to the Whiteheadian sense. Specifically, we believe that there is an intimate connectiqn between process and value, and between organismic togetherness and', the structure of value. Value is the goal of process, process is the means to value. Process allows for the successive realization of mutually exclusive values. It also allows for progressive growth. The growth from lower to higher order societies brings in the realization of higher values, in addition to the successive realization of exclusive values at each level of value. Many details of our metaphysical view can remain open for the moment. We want, however, to emphasize and to develop the following points. We will have several categories of existence. The ultimate category, the final reality, will be bursts of experience, actual occasions, or events. This category is final only in a functional sense. That is, all explanations must ultimately reduce to the fact that some actual occasion made this choice, rather than that. Of course, at a less ultimate level we may be able to go a long way towards explaining the rationale for its choice. But ultimately, it is actual occasions that contribute 'the definiteness 3 of the real. The universe is the gift of finitude. Out of the infinite manifold of possibilities, a world must be constructed by an addition of choices upon choices. The choices are made by the coming together of definiteness in the actual occasions. On the more formal side, we assume that 'modes of togetherness' are the ultimate logical notions. The more usual basic logical notions such as 'and,' 'or,' 'not,' 'implication,' etc., are special cases of external modes. As such they are relevant to fact inquiry only; facts being derivative abstracts from the ultimate togetherness of the actual world. Since we wish to work with the most general modes of togetherness, we are inclined to favor some form of combinatory logic. We suspect that even the rather strange combinator known as the 'infinite cancellator' may play a basic role in our theory. We believe the seat of value is the actual occasion; in particular, generic value is the esthetic quality of experiences. The measure of generic value is an esthetic measure. It is the aim of the early stages of concrescence to integrate the elements of experience so as to satisfy an extremum principle involving the esthetic measure. It is in this way that that actual occasion both achieves its own satisfaction and aims at the relevant future. We realize that many scholars consider the equating of esthetic and generic value to be a commission of the naturalistic fallacy. We agree if esthetic is taken in its normal meaning. Briefly, we are trying to formulate those organizing principles which delimit, but do not determine, the emergence of organismic form. Our point is that form emerges so as to enhance the quality of experience. However one might refer to it, we subsume it under the term 'esthetic.' Esthetics in the normal meaning is concerned with what makes beautiful things beautiful. What makes them beautiful is that, in one way or another, they exhibit those same principles that delimit the emergence of form within the developing life of the experiencer. The various value disciplines can be seen as being on a par with one another, each of them being a particular application of a set of general laws. To confuse a particular application with the general law is a fallacy. However, the stubbornness of the naturalistic fallacy may reflect an important truth. Namely, we suspect the application of the general organizing principles of value to esthetics, in the normal sense, will be relatively direct in comparison to, for instance, ethics which will require the construction of derivative primitives. The esthetic measure is the first critical combination of variables needed for scientific axiology. We are not prepared to say in any defi- nitive way what those variables are, nor what combination of them makes up the esthetic measure. However, for intuitive insight Birkhoff's remarkable work is certainly 4 worthy of consideration. Let us assume that esthetic measure is the density of order, i.e. M= O/C where M, 0, and c stand for measure, order, and respectively. The strategy for increasing the esthetic quality of experience, under this measure, is to arrange for an increase of order and a decrease in complexity. That this does in fact occur we will illustrate with the following discussion. For our example, we will consider the development of a human life. In so doing, we are going some what contrary to what is often considered to be good practice. In the metaphysics which normally dominate western thought, man is somewhat of an abnormality in the scale of things. In our metaphysics man is continuous with the scale of things, except that most universal traits are, in man, highly developed; traits such as 'minding' and 'appetition,' for example, which are at a very low level in inorganic nature, increase through the scale of social complexity from the nexus of atoms, through molecules and cells, to their highest development in man. (Minding is my wife's term for the concrete ordering process which provides meaningful patterns of order and combination to feeling. 'It is that which allows a flower to be a flower and a man to be a man, and provides continuity and purpose to both.') Thus, it is man, himself, who provides the best examples of the full range of universal traits highly developed and integrated. We consider the life of a human to be a sequence of events, of new experience from birth to death. (Some claim these mome.9ts are about 1/10 of a second which is probably about right; roughly 2.05 x 10 10 experiences from birth to retirement.) The human being can also be considered a personal society, as well as actual occasions within a higher order society--society in the normal sense of the word. In discussing the esthetic measure of geometric shapes Birkhoff makes a great deal of axes of symmetry. This is an important clue. We will define the order of an experience to be the number of separate transformation groups which can be applied to the experience. Unfortunately, time does not permit a full and detailed treatment of our theme. Briefly, perception is constructive rather than passively receptive. Human perception and development begins with the establishment of a repertoire of transformation groups, or schema, in the motor system and develops to the transformation groups of the higher mental processes. The higher mental processes give us transformation groups over and above those required to merely function and survive in the world. They are to be expected given the influence of a general drive towards increasing esthetic experience. Thus, it certainly makes sense to say, with Robert S. Hartman (The Structure of Value), that a thing's value is equal to its number of attributes. This is certainly the beginning of the truth, if we remember that 'attributes' is a way of denoting those transformation groups utilized by the nervous system in developing our experience of the thing. As a first approximation, and with fixed complexity, a thing's value is proportional to its number of attributes. 5 Now let us assutne that man has developed, as fully as possible, his potential for creating order in his His next. step must be to decrease complexity. He does this by entering into a higher order society. As we said, we man 'society' in the Whiteheadian sense. That is, a society begins in the formation of a nexus. .. a nexus is a.set of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions of each other, or-:-what is the same thing conversely 'expressedconstituted by their objectifications in each other. (Process and Reality, 14th Category of Explanation.) The nexus becomes a society if in addition, (i) there is a common element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual entities, and (ii) this common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason-of the conditions impose'd upon it by its prehension of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of repro- duction by reason of their inclusiQn of positive feelings of that common form. (Process and Reality, pp. 50-1.) To put it simply, the society reduces complexity by serving as a filter, through time, of the elements in experience. Or, as Burgers puts it so nicely (Experience and Conceptual Activity, p. 59) " The realization of values in a conception becomes more rich and the satisfaction attained more intense when the conception has at its disposition prehensions of certain forms of order already recognized in the experienced data. This is an obvious generalization of what we observe 'in the conceptions arising in the human mind. The required prehensions can be obtained if the process in which the conception arises belongs to a structured society. Thus he concludes The creative urge in the universe promotes the emergence of structured societies of manifold types and of great complexity in order to reach more intense satisfactions And Values are realized in the universe by the grouping of processes into societies and of societes into more extensive societes of elaborate structure. The societies must have a certain persistence and possess a sufficient measure of stability against changes of their environment since otherwise the values would be lost with each such change. There will never be an end to the emergence of new societies.” In conclusion this paper is, at best, a very brief summary of certain key point in our continuing research towards a science of axiology. We do not feel any final commitment to some of the statements made at this time. In particular, we are considering various candidates for notions of order, complexity, and esthetic measure. A formal and adequate theoty of order appears to be a key problem, not only for axiology, but for the foundations of such sciences as biology and psychology as well. 6 Also, we are mindful of the fact that any adequate theory must account for such effects as the mere repetition of order becoming a negative, rather than a positive, effect. We suspect this is due to the requirement of change to realize mutually exclusive values. The exact point at which repetition becomes boring probably depends on time constants of the individual experiencing organism. Whatever changes we may encounter as the work progresses, we do not anticipate any significant change in what we consider to lte the key points. In summary they are: 1. That a scientific axiology is possible. 2. That science means no more, nor less, than the replacement of intui- tive notions by formal ones. 3. That discovering the rationale of value requires a basis in process organismic metaphysics. 4. That expressing the rationale of value requires the replacement of 'normal' logics by combinatory logics. 5. That value evolves in experience according to extremum principles of esthetic measure.